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li. liNTRODUCTION
J.L. Austin expresses the common understanding of the distinction
between j ustifications and excuses, respectively , when he says: "In the one

defense . . . we accept responsibility but deny that it was bad: in the other, we
admit that it was bad but don ' t accept full, or even any, responsibility ."J This
way of dividing up the terrain leaves out a possibility : we accept responsibility
for the deed, admit that it was bad, but argue that our behavior was
understandable under the circumstances and that we should therefore not be
punished. This Article will argue that the criminal law ' s defense of duress per
minas belongs in this third category, and that the category marks out a species
of excuse. Duress is most often , how·ever, understood in terms of one or the
other of the surroundi ng c ategories, thus being thought to be either a
justification or a denial of the voluntariness of the agent's conduct.

Visiting Scholar, Brooklyn Law School; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D. candidate,
Uni';�rsity of Pittsburgh Philosophy Department. The author wishes to thank Kurt Baier, Peter
Detre, George Fletcher, David Gauthier, .Jeffrie Murphy, Kate Stith, and Michael Thompson for
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The idea that justification and lack of voluntariness exhaust the
philosophical basis for legal defenses is the product of a mistaken idea about
responsibility: the assumption that an individual is fully

morally responsible

for

the bad things she does, provided that she does them intentionally .2 Against the
background of this assumption, the two standard approaches to duress fall out
naturally as the only two possible grounds for withholding blame in such cases.
Blame can only be withheld from an actor for something she did intentionally
when the thing done causes more good than harm. If the thing done turns out to
be unintentional, either because it was the consequence of an action that was not
itself intentional, or because it was an unintended consequence of an intentional
action, the question of moral responsibility, in the typical duress case, does not
arise. Against the background of the above idea about responsibility, then, there
are two theories of defense potentially available to defendants in such situations:
justification and excuse, where excuse is taken to mean lack of responsibility.
This Article will argue that the foregoing conception of responsibility is
confused, and it will attempt to show that a third conception of duress becomes
available on an alternative theory of responsibility.
The conception of duress for which the Article will argue is that actions
performed under duress flow from states of character we endorse, such as
loyalty and prudence. While traditional commentary maintains that character is
irrelevant to the criminal law,3 this Article will argue that the modern bias
against character makes a mystery of why we should ever exonerate agents for
harm they bring about intentionally when the infliction of harm does not raise
the aggregate level of social welfare. Although this Article will focus entirely
on the duress defense, other defenses of the criminal law may share the
conceptual structure of duress and thus should lend themselves to similar
analysis.4 For a defense of this sort, there is a gap between the legal use of the
defense and the theoretical rationales commentators are able to offer for it. The
Article attempts to bridge this gap for the duress defense by holding fixed the
current use of the defense and attempting to develop a rationale for it which is
consistent with this use. Existing rationales would all require significant reform
of the law in order to close the gap between theory and practice.
Before continuing, it is important to articulate an assumption which
underlies the present discussion. It is a premise of this Article that a single legal
doctrine, especially one in the criminal arena, should be justified in tern1s of a
single philosophical rationale. Some may object to this assumption, claiming
that certain elements of the defense can be explained under one rationale, while
others seem to lend themselves to explanation under another. But there is a
natural conceptual unity to doctrines in the criminal law, presumably because
the criminal iaw tends to echo moral theory, and there is a conceptual unity to
the various elements of common sense morality. In addition, the single rationale
assumption is justified by the difficulty that would otherwise exist of resolving

2.
The Anicle will assume the view of intentional action most familiar to philosophers,
that articulated by Donald Davidson. See generaily DONALD DAVIDSON, Actions, Reasons and
Causes, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 3 (!980); DONALD DAVIDSON, Agenc..v,
in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS. suora, at -'U.
3.
See FlY MAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRllviiNAL JUSTICE 321-28 ( 1979); Samuel H.
Pillsbury, The M'co..ning of Deserved P:mishment: An Essay on Choice, Character and
Responsibiii:y, 67 lND. L.J. 719, 727 (t992).
i�
See in.fra text accon1_panying notes 109-112.
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cases at the margins: it i s possible to determine whether duress should be
allowed as a defense to murder, for example, only if we can articulate why we
allow a duress defense generally. It i s the premise of this Article, then, that the
demand for a unified treatment of a legal defense is not an excessive one to
make of legal theory.
The next Part presents and explains the most commonly accepted
elements of the duress defense. Parts III and IV then turn to two prevalent
rationales for the defense, referrin g to them as the "welfarist" and the
"voluntarist" conceptions respectively. These Parts attempt to motivate the
search for an alternative conception by showing that neither rationale can form
the basis for a complete theory of duress, since both fail to account for its core
elements. Part V indicates the i ntellectual territory an alternative to the
standard theories should occupy . It considers, among other things, Sections 34
and 35 of the German Criminal Code, which, it argues, point in the direction of
a sensible alternative to the approaches presently available in Anglo-American
law. Part VI attempts to flesh out the suggested approach to duress by focusing
o n the role of dispositions in ethical assessment. It draws s upport from
Aristotle's discussion of ethical j udgment, and in particular, from his distinction
between j udgment of action and j udgment of character. It also expl ores
Aristotle's own discussion of duress, and it argues for an interpretation of his
brief treatment of the subj ect. The proposed theory of duress thus provides a
way of understanding a passage i n Aristotle that commentators have often found
obscure. The Conclusion elaborates the Article' s diagnosis of why the two
standard rationales for duress have long seemed to legal scholars to exhaust the
possible store of explanations for the defense in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF THE DURESS D E F E N S E
The duress defense has prevailed in the following sorts of cases. An
individual robs a liquor store because an aggressor credibly threatens to shoot
him and to harm his family if he does not.S A man smuggles drugs from
Colombia to the United States by swallowing cocaine balloons after he is
threatened with his own death and the death of his famil y . 6 A trav e l e r
participates in a robbery, which turns murderous, upon orders of the principal
assailant and threats by the same to his life.? A person drives a getaway car for
the I.R.A. upon threats to his life by a notorious terrorists A taxicab driver,
threatened by a passenger armed with a gun, drives the passenger to a bank the
latter intends to rob.9
It is important to distinguish between the possible rationales for duress
and the legal requirements that are generally taken to constitute the defense.1o
5 .
State v. Tanner, 3 01 S . E . 2 d 1 6 0 (W. Va. 198 2 ) (defendant found guilty nonetheless
because duress defense disbelieved).
United States v. Contento-Pachon, 7 23 F.2d 69 1 (9th Cir. 1 9 84) .
6.
7.
State v . Hunter, 74 0 P. 2 d 5 5 9 (Kan. 1 9 8 7 ) (duress is defense to felony-murder
where defendant not principal).
8 .
Lynch v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1 All E.R. 913 (H.L . 1975 ) (duress held
acceptable excuse to second degree murder).
9.
People v. Merhige, 18 0 N.W. 418 (Mich. 1920) .
Sometimes courts or commentators w i l l attempt t o offer o n e o f the elements o f the
1 0.
defense as a rationale, such as the fact that the defendant hac! no reasonable opportunity to escape
from the situation, or that the threat was of death or serious bodi l y injury. See infra text
accompanying notes 11-17. But it should be clear that when we speak of the theoretical ground
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As will become clear in the next two Parts, there i s little consensus o n the
former, while the case law, legislation and commentary are fairly consistent in
their acceptance of the latter. Substantive debate focuses mostly on the more
marginal requirements.
The core requirements for claiming the defense are generall y accepted as
the following:
(1) The defendant must have no reasonable opportunity to escape from
the coercive situation. l l
(2) The defendant must be threatened with significant harm-death or
serious bodily injury .l2
(3) The threatened harm must be illegal.J3
(4) The threat must be of imminent harm. l 4
(5) The defendant must not h ave placed herself voluntarily i n a situation
in which she could expect to be subj ect to coercion, as is the case when a
person j oins a violent criminal organization. IS
The two requirements which appear to h ave marginal status are as
follows :
( 6) Duress must not be pleaded a s a defense t o murder. l 6
(7) The defendant must have been acting on a specific command from the
coercer.17
Let us briefly review each requirement in turn.
The first requirement, that the defendant have no reasonable opportunity
to escape, bears on whether the defendant was in fact confronted with the stark
of a legal doctrine, we are looking for something on a different leve l altogether.
1 1.
See, e.g., Pancoast v. Commonwealth, 3 4 0 S . E . 2d 833 (Va. A p p . 1986) (doctor
who failed to take advantage of reasonabl e opportunity to escape barred from claiming she wrote
false prescriptions under duress).
1 2.
See United States v. Shapiro, 669 F.2d 593, 596 (9th Cir. 1982); State v. Scott, 827
P.2d 7 3 3 , 7 39-4 0 (Kan. 1992); Peopl e v. Luther, 232 N.W.2d 1 84, 187 ( M i c h . 1 97 5 ) .
Although this condition i s genera l l y adhered to i n the cases, debate about i t appears i n the
commentary. See, e. g. , WAYNE R . LAFAVE & AUSTIN W . SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 438
(2d. ed. 1 986) ("Ii is not proper, on principle, to l imit the defense of duress to situations where
the instrument of coercion is a threat of death or serious bodily injury . A threat t o do bodil y harm
less than serious bodily harm, or a threat to destroy property or reputation, ought to do . . . "); see
also 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW D EFENSES § 1 77 (c )(2) ( 1 984) (arguing that the
relevant consideration is "the nature of the actor ' s state of coercion and his abi l ity to resist it").
See Regina v. Hurley, 1967 V . R. 5 26, 543.
13.
14.
See, e.g., Shapiro, 669 F.2d at 596; Scott, 827 P.2d 739.
1 5.
Scott (defendant who j oined drug-selling organization voluntaril y barred from
claiming duress when coerced into torturing fellow member).
1 6 . This condition is debated in the commentary, see 2 ROBINSON, s up ra note 1 2,
§177(g)( l ), but the prohibition seems to hold firm in the case law, see State v. H unter, 74 0 P.2d
559 (Kan. 1987); State v. Strickland, 29 8 S.E.2d 645 (N. C . 1983 ) ; Cawthon v. State, 382
So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.198 0); State v . Little, 312 S. E . 2d 695, 697 (N. C . Ct. App.
1984).Courts have sometimes allowed the defense to a charge of accomplice murder, see Lynch
v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1 All E.R. 913 (H.L. 1 97 5 ) (accepting defendant's plea of
duress to charge of aiding and abetting murder o f police officer), or to felony-murder, see
Hunter (accepting plea to charge of fel ony-murder where defendant claimed he was not

triggerman).

1 7.
S22 lViartin R. Gardner, The
Prison-A Step Tmvards Incarceration

128-130 (i975).

Defense of Necessity and the Right to Escape from
Free from Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. R EV . 11 0,
'

1995 ]

FINKELSTEIN

255

choice between suffering the threatened harm and performing the illegal act. If
another course of conduct was open to the defendant, such as reporting the
threat to the authorities, the defendant is obligated to pursue that option. While
this requirement bears some relation to the imminence requ irement, 1 8 it is
conceptually separate from it, since it is possible for threatened harm to be
imminent yet for the defendant to have a way of avoiding the illegal act other
than suffering the harm.
The requirement that the threat be of significant h arm actually
incorporates two separate requirements : the condition that the defendant have
received an actual threat, and the condition that the threatened harm be of
sufficient gravity. First, requiri n g an actual threat rules out coercion by
unusually attractive offers, such as the offer of a high-paying job to an indigent
if he carries out some illegal act.l 9 It also rules out threats that are merely
i nherent in a situation, such as a menacing dog or the risk of an avalanche.2o
Threatening conditions are believed to be more appropriately raised under the
category of necessity.2 1 Nevertheless, an actual threat has been found to exist
when the threat was only implied by the coercer' s general behavior.22 It need
not be an articulated threat. Second, courts are fairly consistent in requiring
that the threatened harm be of death or grievous bodily injury .23 Although the
definition of "grievous bodily inj ury" is vague, it appears to mean roughly
inj ury that is life-threatening or which "seriously interfere[s] with [the victim' s ]
health and comfort. "24 The requirement is generally taken t o exclude non
physical harm, such as loss of reputation or psychological distress.2s
The requirement that the threatened act be illegal rules out use of the
defense when , for example, the coercer is acting under a claim of right. B u t
this requirement hardly requires articulation, since threats t o perform legal acts
will not result in illegal conduct.26 A person who threatens another with inj ury
will not be able to claim his actions are justified if he demands the performance
of an illegal act. As discussed below,27 if one allows that the defense can be
claimed for responses to threats that are not themselves commanded by the
coercer, it becomes possible for a person to commit an unlawful act in response
to a lawful threat. Thus a defendant could trespass on private property to escape
from a threat of bodily injury when the threat was issued in defense of a third
party. Duress should p resumably not be available as a defense to trespass in
such a case.28
See infra text accompanying notes 29-3 1 .
See Joshua Dress l er, Exegesis of the Law of D uress: Justifying the ExntSe and
Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV . 1 33 1 , 1 33 6 ( 1989) ("Duress implicates
18.
1 9.

threats, not offers.").
20.
!d. at 1 3 3 9 .
A s discussed below, distinguishing defenses according to the source of the threat i s
21.
ad h o c and should probably be abandoned. See infra text accompanying note 48.
2 2.
See People v. Pena, 1 9 7 C a l . Rptr. 264, 272 (Cal. A p p . Dep't Super. Ct. 1 98 3 ) ;
Regina v . Valderrama-Vega, 1 985 Crim. A p p . 220.
See supra note 1 2.
23.
24.
Well ar v. People, 3 0 Mich. 1 6,20 ( 1 874); Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 74 A . 2d 1 25 ,
1 30 ( Pa. l950).
See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 1 2, at 436.
25.
26.
See Dressler, supra note 19, at 1 3 39-40.
27.
See infra text accompanying notes 35-36.
See generally Herbert Fingarette, Victimization: A Legalist Analysis of Coercion,
28.
Deception, UndLte Influence, and Excusable Prison Escape, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 65, 79
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The imminence requirement, while strongl y suppo rted b y the
j urisprudence of duress,29 is in fact a proxy for several other, distinct concerns.
One might see it as an attempt to ensure that the defendant committed the illegal
act because of the threat received. The defense would be open to abuse, for
example, if a defendant were able to claim she performed an illegal act because
of a threat that something terrible would befall her in several years. S uch a
threat might be too diffuse to make the defendant actually believe she was under
serious pressure to comply .3o The requirement is thus generally understood as
ensuring that the threat is "operating upon the mind of the defendant at the time
of the alleged act. "31 In addition, the imminence requirement bolsters the "no
escape" requirement. The longer the period of time between the threat and the
threatened harm, the greater the chances that the defendant can find a w ay out
of the situation.
The requirement that the defendant not have placed himsel f intentionall y
in a situation i n which h e knew he would b e subj ect to coercion i s on somewhat
shakier ground than the other core requirements, since there is little case law
on the question. It appears, however, to be generally accepted in codifications
and commentary.32 The Model Penal Code ("MPC") disallows the defense in
such a case, and even goes so far as to bar the defense when the defendant was
reckless or negligent in entering a situation in which he could expect to be
coerced, when recklessness or negligence respectively are sufficient mens rea
for the offense. 3 3 The general point of the requirement is clear: i ndividuals
should be excused from bad acts only when they are in fact blameless with
respect to those acts. A person who intentionally enters a coercive situation is
not free from blame when he performs a criminal act under threat. In addition,
the requirement serves an obvious deterrence function, since it may dissuade
individuals from j oining organizations they foresee will pressure them to
commit illegal acts.
As we shall see, the requirement that duress not be pleaded as a defense
to murder makes little sense under either of the prevalent rationales for the
defense. Nevertheless, most courts have accepted the restriction.34 Further
discussion of this requirement will await the explanation of the rationales in the
next two Parts.
Finally, requiring that the act be commanded by the coercer should make
the defense inapplicable where the defendant undertakes a method of avoiding
the threatened harm on his own initiative. The typical case is one in which the
defendant escapes from prison following threats of death, imminent bodily
harm, or sexual abuse and the prison guards are unreliable as a source of
suc c o r . 35 But the jurisdictions that do allm.v a defense in this situation are
n.42 (1985).
2 9.
See Dressler, supra. note 19, at
as "entrenched in American legal history").

1340 & n .46 (describing

the imminence requirement

30.
The imminence requirement should probably be taken to apply to two different time
periods if it is to satisfy these concerns: the period in between the moment of the threat and the
time of the defendant' s illegal act. and the period in between the moment of the threat and the
time when the threat was to have been carried out.
3 l.
People v. Luther, 232 N .V/.2d 184, 187 (Mich. 1975).
32.
See C'.essler, supra nme 19, a t 134!.
3 3.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2) (1980)

3 4.
3 5.

See

suora

Wher�

note 16.

courts have allowed the defense in such cases, the defer.dant must turn
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divided over whether the correct defense is duress or necessity .36
As the above discussion demonstrates, there has been a fairly consistent
approach to actual c ases involving the duress defense, and commentators
generally agree that the core elements of the defense should be retained. Despite
the clarity of application, however, there is little consensus on the reason for
allowing a defense with these requirements. Courts ignore the question, and
commentators either do the same or offer confused rationalizations. This has
made principled debate about the more marginal cases difficult, and has left the
basis for exoneration in cases in which the defense is accepted mysterious. The
next two Parts will explore the two most prevalent rationales for the defense in
the legal commentary. The theories discussed form opposite philosophical
approaches to the problem of duress. As these Parts will show , both approaches
fail to capture many of the core elements of the defense.
Ill. THE WELFARIST CONCEPTION
The utilitarian approach to duress rationalizes the defense on the grounds
that violating the law in the typical case of duress raises the level of social
welfare . The Article will accordingly refer to this view as the "welfarist"
conception. The welfarist c onception regards the duress defense as a
justi fication : it denies that acts performed under duress are bad acts . This
approach echoes the doctrine of necessity, according to which an agent can
claim he was justified in breaking the law if the criminal act was a lesser evil
than would have occurred had the defendant not acted. Thus, the actor who sets
fire to a field to prevent the destruction of a town can claim the destruction of
property is j ustified because it was the lesser evil.
The clearest proponents of the welfarist conception are W ayne LaFave
and Austin Scott:
The rationale of the defense of duress is that, for reasons of social policy,
it is better that the defendant, faced with a choice of evils, choose to do
the lesser evil (violate the criminal law) in order to avoid the greater evil
threatened by the other person. 37

Glanville Williams also appears to favor this approach. He says that the reason
for allowing a claim of duress is "precisely the same as that for allowing the
defense of necessity, and in this respect duress can be regarded as a type of
necessity . "38 And Jeremy Bentham says that in the case of something done "in
the way of precaution against instant cal amity," the actor shouid not be
punished where, "although a mischief was produced by that act, yet the same act
was necessary to the production of a benefit vvhich was of greater value than the
mischief."39 In addition, the criminal codes of four states explicitly treat duress
himself over to the authorities upon reaching a position of safety. United States v. Bailey, 444
U.S. 394 (1980); see also Gardner, supra note 17 .
36.
Compare People v. Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr . 110 (Ct. A p p. 1974) (all owing the
defense of necessity against prosecution for prison escape when defendant threatened with
imminent homosexual attack) with Peopl e v. Hannon, 220 N.W.2d 212 (Mich. App. 1974)
(ac cepting duress as a defense to prison escape).
LAFAVE & SCOTT, suora note i2, at 433.
3 7.
38.
GLANViLLE WiLL!A �lS, CRIMiNAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 755-56 (2d ed.
1961 ).
See JEREMY BENTHAt'vl, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATiON at
39.
XIII .V.2. But Bentham also seems to think that at least some cases of coercion are more l ike
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as a j ustification.4o
There are two ways one might interpret the emphasis on social welfare.
First, one might suppose that a defendant can plead the defense only when his
individual act increases the l evel of social welfare, where the baseline is the
h arm that would have occurred without the defendan t ' s i nterventio n .
Alternatively , o n e might allow the defense insofar a s the rule a llowing the
defense would enhance social welfare, where the baseline is the level of social
welfare in a world without such a defense. The first approach would c onsider
the welfare effects of submission to coercion act-by-act. The second would
consider the welfare effects of a legal rule permitting the defense.4 1 The next
two Sections will consider each version of the welfarist rationale respectively .
A.

The Act-Utilitarian

Version

While proponents of the welfarist position do not explicitly endorse act
utilitarianism, talk of lesser evils appears to focus on the social welfare effects
of the individual act of submission to the threat. These discussions devote little
or no attention to the secondary effects of allowing the defense. This emphasis
is unfortunate, since the act-by-act approach is the less plausible of the two
possible welfarist j ustifications for the defense. Let us conside r how the
approach fares in application to the elements of the defense set out above.42
The act-utilitarian approach can arguably explain the first requirement,
namely the condition that the defendant have had no reasonable opportunity to
escape from the coercive situation, on evidentiary grounds. The availability of a
legal means of escape implies that submitting to the threat i s unlikel y to
maximize utility . If the requirement serves an evidentiary purpose, h owever, it
ought merely to create a rebuttable presumption: a defendant ought in theory to
be able to prove that it would be utility-maximizing for him to submit to the
threat, despite the existence of a legal means of escape, if escape would be more
costly than submission to the threat. One might nevertheless j ustify the "no
escape" provision on act-utilitarian grounds by noting that epistemic problems
are likely to make rebutting a presumption of disutility in this case infeasible.
Most of the remaining requirements are even less readily explained o n an
act-uti litarian view. The requirement that the threat be of death or serious
bodily injury is highly arbitrary from an act-utilitarian standpoint, since an
agent threatened with minor bodily injury or loss of property maximi zes utility
by giving in to the threat when the coercer demands that she bring about any
lesser harm. A defendant threatened with a broken finger should have a valid
defense against a parking violation, on this view. No matter how insignificant
the threat, it is always possible for performance of the illegal act to constitute a
involuntary, than voluntary action. !d. at XIII.XI.S.
40.
ARIZ . REV. STAT. ANN. § 13 -412 (1978); IOW A CODE ANN . § 704. 10 (West
1979); LA . REV. STAT. ANN . § 14.18(6) (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §
103-A (West 1983 ).
41.
There is another "rule-utilitarian" interpretation one might adopt. One can ask
whether acts of submission to coercive threats are generally utility-maximizing. This approach
would not consider the secondary welfare effects of incorporating the defense into a legal rule,
but rather would limit its consideration to the welfare effects of a certain class of acts. The Article
focuses on the more general rule-utilitarian approach, since it is more relevant to assessing the
desirability of legal rules.
4 2.
See s!lpra text accompanying notes 11-17.
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lesser evil. The restriction, moreover, does not normally apply t o the necessity
defense.43 It is not surprising, then, that LaFave and Scott, as well as Williams,
rej ect the requirement as applied to duress.44 B ut, as discussed below in the
context of the voluntarist approach, there may be good reasons for the
restriction which the welfarist conception cannot represent.45
The immi nence requirement is equally inexplicable on a welfarist
rationale. If the salient consideration is maximizing social utility, why should it
matter whether the threatened harm is imminent, as long as it is sufficiently
certain to happen as to make calculations of social utility reliable? Perhaps one
will respond that imminence is a proxy for high l ikelihood of occurrence. But
if so, it is far from a reli able one, and courts could simply evaluate the
likelihood of occurrence, or at least the apparent likelihood of occurrence,
directly .
The requirement that the defendant not have placed herself in a situation
in which she could expect to be subject to coercion is also inexplicable on the
act-utilitarian view. If performing the illegal act would be welfare maximizing
under the circumstances, an act-utilitarian cannot support disal l owing the
defense. As we shall see, rule-based forms of utilitarianism may not have this
difficulty , since the defense can be j ustified in terms of the apparent incentive
effects that a rule allowing the defense under these circumstances would create.
But act-utilitarianism cannot consider general incentive effects: it is limited to
an ex post evaluation of the welfare effects of a single act.
The unavailability of the defense to murder appears at first to fare better
than the other requirements under an act-utilitarian approach. If lives are of
equal worth, then social welfare is not enhanced when one person blls another
to save himself. But upon further consideration, act-utili tari anism may have
difficulty accounting for this condition as wel l . An act-utilitarian ought to
endorse the defense to a charge of murder if the defendant is coerced into
killing one person for the sake of saving a greater number. IVIurder under these
circumstances creates a net benefit, again, assuming lives are of equal worth.
More troubling still, however, a careful utilitarian should probably rej ect the
premise that lives are of equal worth . The existence of a rich philanthropist
may confer more social uti lity than the existence of an unemployed, unskilled
welfare recipient. If consistently applied, the lesser evils approach should tie the
availability of the defense in cases of murder to an evaluation of the relative
worth of victim and defendant. And thi s , one might be justified in saying,
constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of the lesser evils approach.
There are other, more general problems with the welfarist conception.
First, it has difficulty explaining why necessity and duress remain separate
defenses in most of Anglo-American law: the penal codes of the vast majority
of American jurisdictions, as well as the MPC, distinguish them in separate

See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 12, at 445 .
43 .
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 12, at 43 8 (arguing that threat of less than serious
44.
bodi ly harm or threat to destroy property should be sufficient if act done to avoid threat is
relatively minor); WILLIAMS, supra note 3 8, at 756-57; see also sources cited supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
45 .
See infra Part IV.
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p r o v i s i o n s , 4 6 a s does B ritish l aw.47 B u t since duress and necessity are
redundant, on the welfarist conception, one would expect the two defenses to be
combined under a general lesser evils defense. The welfarist conception thus
has some explaining to do if it is to present itself as an accurate descriptive
account of the duress defense. It can, alternatively, be presented as a normative
theory, one which seeks to abolish duress as a separate defense. B u t on this
strategy, the welfarist conception i s not so much an account of duress as an
argument against the possibility of such an account. The problem i s that the
concept of coercion is absorbed into the more general principle of maximizing
social welfare, and thus coercion disappears as an i ndependent ground of
exculpation.
This is no doubt the reason why the welfarist conception often turns to a
distinction based on the source of the threat: duress results from man-made
threats, and necessity pertains to threats from natural forces.48 A person caught
in a mountain storm struggling for survival can claim necessity in breaking into
a mountain cabin she discovers. An actor threatened by another human being
with death if she does not rob the bank would still be j ustified, on the welfarist
account, but her defense is duress. The problem with this solution, however, is
that the distinction seems ad hoc . Surely it i s irrelevant from a n ormative
perspective whether the source of the threat i s man or nature. And i f i t i s not
normatively relevant, and if duress and necessity are alike in every respect save
this, then the distinction between duress and necessity cannot be a relevant one
either. B ut if the distinction is irrelevant, why should the law retain two
separate defenses?
Second, it may be difficult for the welfarist conception to handle cases of
mistake about the availability of a j ustification. There are two sorts of mistake
that can occur: the defendant can think his behavior is j ustified when it is not,
and he can think his behavior is not j ustified when it i s . The welfaris t
c o ncepti on, at least on the act-utilitarian interpretation, i m p l i e s that the
defendant should not be able to claim the defense in the former case but be
allowed the defense in the latter.
If the basis for the defense is that the action does more good than harm,
on a welfarist conception, the defense should be unavailable if the action in fact
does more harm than good, even if the defendant reasonably believes it does
more good than harm. The implic ation is that the welfarist conception must
hold defendants strictly liable for their j udgments about the availability of the
defense. This would contradict the general approach to mistakes about the
availability of a justification, since the law usually allows such actors to claim
the benefit of the j ustification nonetheless.49 Moreover, welfarists themselves
46.
M ODEL P ENAL C O D E §§ 2.09, 3 .0 2 ; see Paul H. Robi nson, Crim i n a l Law
Defenses, 82 COLUM . L. REV. 1 9 9 , 2 3 5 n. 1 3 5 ( 1 9 8 1 ) .
See WILLIAMS, supra note 3 8 , § § 23 1 , 242.
47.
See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 12, at 441.
48.
!d. at 436; see also A l lison & Coleman v. City of B inningham, 5 8 0 S o . 2d 13 7 7 ,
49.
i 3 8 0 (/•.I a . 199 1 ) ("Most c a s e s d o not require that an actual peri l e x i s t ; a w e l l - fo u nded a n d
reasonable belief is s u fficient. Therefore, i f an actor i s actually mistaken i n h i s belief, he m a y
s t i l i u s e t h e defense."); Nelson v. State , 597 P . 2 d 977 (Alaska 1979); City of Chicago v. M ayer,
308 l'·� .E.2d 601 ( I l l . 1 974). But see State v. J acobs, 371 So.2d 801 (La. 1979) (holding that
actual necessity i s requi red for a reasonable agent to clai m defense of necessity). LaFave and
S c ott criticize this l atter decision. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 1 2, at 446 n . 3 8 . They also
claim, however, that the defendant ' s view o f the gravity of the evils does not govern: "It is for
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appear to agree with this approach. LaFave and Scott, for example, say that the
danger the defendant fears "need not be real," and that it i s sufficient if the
defendant "reason ably believes it to be real . "So They cite a case for this
proposition, however, in which the court offered largely a subj ective o r
psychologi cal rationale for the defense.S I As discussed in Part I V , it i s natural
for a subj ective approach to ignore whether the threat is real . B u t the position
can not be adequately explained on an act-utilitarian rationale for the defense. s 2
Of course this does not require the welfarist to maintain that reasonable
mistakes will not exonerate. He can claim that even if an actor mistaken as to
the availability of a justification is not in fact j ustified, he i s excused under the
doctrine of mistake.53 On this approach, one would treat an actor mistaken
about the availability of a necessity defense as excused rather than justified. But
a view that treats duress as a j usti fication cannot easily adopt thi s same
structure, since the approach would entail some quite arbitrary distinctions.
Compare the standard duress case in which a person i s ordered at gun point to
rob a bank with an identical case in which the gun is later discovered to have no
bullets. The latter situation never was life-threatening, although the defendant ' s
belief that h i s life was being threatened w a s reasonable. I t seems arbitrary to
say that the defendant threatened with a l oaded gun has a j ustification but to say
that the defendant threatened with the empty gun has a mere excuse. Our
intuitions about the cases are identical, and the legal doctrines of exoneration
ought to be as well.
Now consider the second sort of mistake case, that in which the defendant
unknowingly creates more good than harm. If the act-utilitarian approach i s
strictly construed, the defendant ought t o b e able t o claim the benefit o f her
luck, since she has performed an action which enhanced, rather than
diminished, the level of social welfare. This i s problematic, however, since
defenses are normally available to defendants on the basis of their ex ante
calculations . The person unaware of circumstances that could j ustify her
behavior is as culpable as if those circumstances did no: exist. This is at least in
part because she would presumably be willing to repeat the act without the
benefit of j ustification in the future. It is part of the notion of j ustification that
it requires knowledge of the circumstances constituting the j us ti fication .54 A
the court, not the defendant, to weigh the relative harmfulness of the two alternatives." !d. at
446-47. In other words, it is not the actor' s value svstem that detennines which o f two evil s is
the lesser. The assessment of the relative gravity of the evils must be obj ective. Tne case law
appears to support thi s position. See United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1 002, 1 008 (4th Cir.
1 969) C'[T]he exercise of a moral judgment based upon individual standards does not c arry with
it l egal j ustifi cation . . . "); State v. Fee, 489 A.2d 606 ( N . H . 1 9 85) (court rej ects defendant' s
judgment a s to which option i s lesser o f two evils).
S0.
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 1 2, at 436.
People v. Luther, 2 3 2 N.W.2d 1 84 (Mich. 1 975) .
51.
We return to this question in the discussion of the rule-utilitarian version of the
52 .
welfarist position below. See infra Section B.
53 .
There is some support for this approach in the case law. See Peopl e v . Scott, 1 94
Cal . Rptr. 6 3 3 (Ct. App. 1 9 8 3 ) (finding defendant who had ingested hallucinogens excused for
car theft on grounds that he reasonably believed action was necessary to save life of himself and
the president).
54.
LaFave and Scott appear to agree. at least in the case of necessity. They say that
actual necessi ty, without knowledge and i n tention to act on the necess i t8us circumstances, i s
never enough t o exonerate a n age ut. L A F A V E & S C O T T , s up ra note 1 2, at 446 . It seems,
however, that one need not be aware that the circumstances constitute a legal j us tification; one
need only be aware of the circumstances themse! ves and perform the c.r: t in question because of
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j ustification is a type o f motivating reason, and o n e cannot have s u c h a reason
of which one is unaware .ss This u nderscores the inadequacy of w elfarist
theories of duress : if the basis for the defense is enhancement of social welfare,
the mentali stic, or reason-related nature of the defense remains unexplained.56
B.

The Rule-Utilitarian

j
;

1
j
l

Version

One might attempt to render the welfarist conception more plausible by
turning from act to rule-utilitarianism. The latter would attempt to j ustify
duress in terms of the utility of having a legal rule permitting defendants to
plead duress. Rule-utilitari anism allows a certain leeway : an act p e rformed
under duress would not itself have to be welfare-enhancing to be permissible.
The act would merely have to fall under a rule permitting the defense, and the
rule would be j ustified by social welfare considerations.
The philosophical, as opposed to the legal, literature on duress appears to
favor this approach. A number of philosophers, for example, have argued that
the defense is j ustified by the simple fact that a rule forbidding such acts could
not be welfare enhancing because it would not be obeyed. Jeremy B entham
thought it would be impossible to punish an act performed out of mortal fear
sufficiently to induce an actor to refrain from performing the act: "the eveil
which he sets himself about to undergo, in the case of his not engaging in the
act, i s so great, that the eveil denounced by the penal clause, in the c ase of his
engaging in it, cannot appear greater."57 Thomas Hobbes also adopted a
deterrence rationale, saying that in a case in which a person i s compelled to
break the law by terror of present death, a person would reason thu s : "If I doe
it not, I die presently; if I doe it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there
is time of life gained. "5 8 Strangely enough, even the most avid anti-utilitarian,
these circumstances.
55.
A motivating reason is what philosophers sometimes call an "internal reason," i . e . , a
reason for acting which the agent takes himsel f to have and one which irnpels him toward action.
A n "external reason" is generally thought to be a consideration which points i n favor o f an action
by which the agent is not motivated. On some versions, a reason which is potentially motivating,
given an agent' s psychological constitution, counts as an internal reason even if it is not actually
motivating. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, Internal and External Reasons, in �.I! OR A L LUCK 1 0 1
( 1 981).
56.
O n e might wish t o object that the approach t o this sort o f case is n o t consistent with
other features of moralily. Permitting defendants to take advantage of their luck is not, after all,
u nfamil iar i n ethics, see id. at 20, nor i s i t foreign to the law. If two defendants aim at a human
being and they both shoot, and i f one hits and the other misses, the former can b e c harged with
murder, while the latter cannot be. Yet the l atter is not a better person, from a moral point of
view. He j ust got lucky. Analogously, one might argue that the agent whose evil behavior saves
a greater evil from occurring should benefit from his luck. Yet the intuition in this case is entirely
different.
The difference might be explained by the fact that the unaware defendant is attempting to
offer his "luck" as a defense to an imputation of culpability that arises from harm the agent has
actually caused. In the case of the l ucky gunman, however, the ham1 that would make h i s
behavior culpable i n the first place h a s n o t occurred. Tnus in t h e latter situation, t h e elements of
the prima facie case do not exist, and the question of culpability (at least culpability for mmder)
does not ari s e . The defendant who is u n aware of c ircumstances justify i n g h i s act has
successfully carried out a criminal act, and he has done the act intentionally. The question of
culpability thus cannot be avoided. The individual who fires and misses, however, can usually
be convicted for an attempt, but that is another matter altogether.
57.
B ENTHAM, supra note 3 9 , at XIII.Xl.5.
THOMAS H O B B E S , LE V I A T H A N c h . 27 ( R ichard Tuck ed. , 1 99 1 ) (emphasis
58.
omitted).
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Immanuel Kant, defended the duress defense o n deterrence grounds,
characterizing necessity as a situation in which "no punishment threatened by
the law could be greater than losing [one' s] life."59
The foregoing approac hes, however, are confused. First, the
philosophers incorrectly limit their analyses to threats of death. But there i s no
theoretical j ustification for ruling out use of the defense in situ ations in which
the threat i nvolves harm of a lesser degree. As discussed above,6o the duress
defense is applicable to lesser threats. S econd, pain and torture can always be
added to death to make the punishment worse from the standpoint of expected
utility than the death one would suffer at the hands of one' s coercer. There are,
of course, o ther arguments agai nst i ncreasing penalties i n thi s way , but
B entham does not address them. Third, focusing o n deterrence as the
philosophers do is problematic because the difficulty of deterring such crimes
can cut the other way: one can argue that the penalties for acts performed under
duress should be more, rather than less, severe, since such acts are more
difficult to deter.6 t Assuming we wish to deter coerced acts, we will simply
have to penalize them more harshly than we otherwise would. Of course the
argument does not hold if these acts are literally impossible to deter. B ut the
availability of ever more stringent penalties makes this assumption unreliable.62
In addition, a deterrence analysis of the defense is not conclusive. In
theory , n othing prevents the illegalization of a course of action which is
impossible to deter. Granted, for a utilitarian such as B entham, deterrence is
the only j ustification for punishment, and thus disallowing the defense is
unj ustified if it is impossible to deter coerced behavior. But one would not
expect a non-utilitarian to adopt this position, since for him there are other
potential j ustifications for disallowing the defense. On a retributivist rationale
for punishment, for example, the agent' s culpability implies that he deserves to
suffer in proportion to the suffering he has inflicted. Punishment for an offense
must be inflicted, then, even if there is no hope of deterring the offender.
If acts performed under duress are not impossible to deter, there is no
quick and easy rule-utilitarian analysis of whether a duress defense is j u stified
on social welfare grounds. We can approach the question by returning to the
various elements of the defense and asking whether each one is j ustified in rule
utilitarian terms.
There are two requirements which fare better under a rule-utilitarian
than an act-utilitarian interpretation. First, that the defendant have had no
reasonable opportunity to escape need not lead merely to a rebuttable
presumption, as on the act-utilitarian interpretation. This follows directly from
the fact that a rule can be justified on social utility grounds even if utility
calculations occasionally weigh against allowing the defense. Second, the
requirement that the defendant not have placed herself voluntarily in a situation
in which she could expect to be coerced also fares better on a rule-utilitarian
approach. Thi s is because the requirement addresses itself to an act of the
59.
IMMANUEL KANT, Appendix to the Introduction
M ETAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 4 1 ( 1 96 5 ) .
60.
61.

to the Elements of Justice, in THE

See sources cited supra note 1 2 and accompanying text.
The argument is Anthony Kenny' s . Anthony Kenny, Duress Per Minas as a Defence
to Crime: II, 1 LAW & PHIL. 1 97 , 203 ( 1 9 8 2).
62.
Cf R I C H A R D A . POS N E R , ECONOMIC A NALYSIS OF LAW 2 29-30 (4th ed. 1 99 2 )
(describing efforts t o institute strictly increasing schedule of penalties in medieval England).
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defendant ' s which occurs pri or t o t h e moment o f coercion. Even i f i t w ou l d

increase

social uti l i ty for a defendant t o succumb t o coercion i n a given i nstance

i n w h i c h the coercion could have been foreseen

ex ante,

a rul e disallowing the

defense in such s i tuations i s arguably effi cient : i t may deter i n dividuals from
entering into cri mi n al organizations. This is not a resu l t we could have reached
o n an act- utilitarian interpretati o n .
F o r the most part, however, a rule-utilitarian j us tification for t h e defense
w i l l share the defects of i ts act-uti litarian counterpart. For examp l e , l ike act
u ti l itarianism, rule-utilitari anism has difficul ty j us ti fying the requ irement that
the threatened harm be of death or serious bodil y i nj ury. If, as w e s aw , the
requ i rement fai l s as an act-utili tarian accoun t because there are potentia l l y
m an y s it uations i n which soci al u t i li ty w o u l d b e enhanced b y a l l o w i n g t h e
defense for l esser threat s , t h e n a

rule

w h i c h disallows t h e defe n s e f o r lesser

threats will not be utility enhancing either. Simi larl y , i f i t would i ncrease social
u t i l i ty to allow the defense in situations i n which the threatened h arm i s n o t
imminent, then a

rule

requ iring i mminence could n o t b e socially efficient. Nor

does the rule-utilitarian version of welfarism help to distingu i s h duress from
necessity. We will still be left w ith having to accept a single, lesser evils defense
to cover the two defenses. Again , whether this is obj ectionable on i t s o w n
merits depends o n whether one thinks the defenses

should b e

kept separate. B ut

the w e l farist, who appears committed to regarding duress and n e c e s sity as
separate defenses, will have to regard this as a strike against his account.
The rule-utilitarian may fare some�ihat better i n the debate abo u t the
avail ability of the defense to murder, but the res u l t i s inconclusive . He can
respond to rhe charge that a uti l i tarian b asis for the defense requires an absurd
e v a l u ation of the worth of l i ves by s a y i n g rhat the epistemi c d i ffi c u l t i e s
as soci ated w i t h attemp ting to determ i n e t h e worth of a human l i fe are
insurmountable. Even if the worth of a human life could be assessed, there is no
reason to suppose that this assessment will be avai lab l e to victim s of coercion,
'Nho m u s t make quick decisions with relatively little information. Social uti l i ty
i s thus perhaps best served by treati n g human l i ves as equal in worth. B u t i f a
defendant knnv the respective worth of the l i ves i n volved, there would be n o
epistemic benefit to the assumption that l ives are of equal wort h . In t h i s case, a
\Ve l fare-maximizing rule would have to require that the ava i l ab i l ity of the
defense turn on the worth of the l i ves involved. For thi s reaso n , we cannot
s tr a i g h t - forwardly

conclude

that

the

w e l fari s t

approach

e nd o r s e s

the

unavailability of the defense t o murder.
Fi n a lly consider the applicability of rule-utilitarianism to the two forms
,

of m i s take discus sed abov e . The rule- utilitarian can argue that a rul e which
allows reasonably mistaken act ors to claim the benefit of a j u s tifi c ation would
b e efficient. S ince epi stemic l imitations make diffi c u l t a determination o f
w hether

a j usti fication properly appl i es t o a gi v e n situ ati o n , people w i l l b e
their own j udgment about t h e availability of a

discouraged from rel ying o n

j ustifi c ation i f they are held strictl y l i able for their mi stakes . Th i s arg u ment,
however, s eem s weak. S trict l i ab i l i ty about the avai l abil i ty of the defense is
u n l i kely to have much of a chilling effect

on

behavior.

Someone

acting u n d e r

duress bas rnore important considerations to Vieigh than the remote possibi lity
that her perception of the situation will prove crronem; s . Given the importance
of the issues at stake, and, at least i n the case of dures s , the personal i nterests at
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stake, the residual possibility of error i s likely to seem of pale significance in
the actor' s deliberations about what to do.
The turn to rule-utilitarianism also does not appear to i mprove the
answer that the welfarist can give to the second sort of mistake case, the actor
unaware of j ustifying circ umstances. For if a defendant is allowed to take
advantage of his luck and claim the defense where what he has done is socially
beneficial, regardless of whether he acted in order to raise the level of social
welfare, he will, by defi nition, be permitted the defense only i n c ases i n which
he actually does some good. There cannot be any harm, then, in a rule that
allows for exculpation under these conditions, since an actor will never be able
to claim the defense in a situation in which his behavior is socially detrimental.
But perhaps the argument is that defendants will start to gamble, giving
in to threats where, at least given what they know at the time, they should not.
So, the argument might run, defendants will be encouraged to take foolish
risks, hoping that they will get lucky and that their behavior will turn out to be
j ustified. This is surely a weak argument, however, since the chances that one
will be able to avail oneself of a j ustification that one does not now believe
oneself to have are presumably too low to create an incentive for defendants to
perform illegal acts they would not otherwise perform.
A welfarist approach to duress, then, fails to provide a j ustification for
the defense as it presently exists in the law, since most of the elements of the
defense make little sense if welfare-maximization is our only concern. This is
true whether the units over which we attempt to maximize utility are i ndividual
acts or rules governing acts of a certain type. Duress is simply not a defense
that can be captured by welfarist thin king.
V. THE V OLUNTARIST C O N C EPTION
B oth the academic literature on duress and the statutory codifications of
the defense contain expressions of an entirely different rationale, one that is
subj ective or psychological : an individual who performs an action out of fear
for his life may lack the ability to conform his behavior to the law. Paul
Robinson, for example, says that " [t]he excusing condition in duress i s the
impairment of the actor' s ability to control his conduct."63 Proponents of the
voluntarist conception regard the basis for exoneration as a loss of control
resulting from an impaired psychological state. The typical formulation thus
treats the defense as negating voluntariness. A B ritish case, for example, says
that duress is a defense when "the will of the accused has been overborne by
threats of death or serious personal injury so that the commission of the alleged
offense was no longer the voluntary act of the accused."6-+ George Fletcher says
that " [e]xcuses apply on behalf of morally involuntary responses to danger; they
acknowledge that when individuals merely react rather than choose to do
wrong, they cannot fairly be held accountable."65 And the court in People v.
Luther explained the grounds for duress as the fact that "compulsion or duress
overcomes the defendant ' s free will and his actions lack the required mens

63.
6 4.

65.

ROBINSON, supra

Regina

v.

note 12, at 3 5 1 .
Hudson, 2 All E . R . 244, 24 6 (C. A . 197 1 ) .

GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW

8 1 1 ( 1 97 8 ) (emphasis added).
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rea."66
On this view, duress is an excuse rather than a j ustific atio n . If an
individual follows a certain course of conduct because he literally cannot bring
himself to do otherwise, his exoneration does not depend on his h aving done the
right thing. An actor overwhelmed by fear cannot be expected to deliberate
about his options, and consequently he cannot be blamed if he acts badly . The
rel ative gravity of the harms is irrelevant, on this view, since duress i s
u nderstood a s a claim that o n e was unable t o deliberate about relative h arms
and benefits. It is true that a defendant who accedes to the demands of a coercer
may bring about less harm than he would by resisting these demands, since i n
the typical case h e i s threatened with death and ordered t o p erform some
criminal act that does not involve death. B ut the fact that the defendant brings
about the lesser evil in some cases is an accidental benefit of the situ ation, from
a moral point of view. An individual overcome with fear acts b e c a us e he i s
overcome, and n o t because h e sees that the act he is inclined to perform t o save
himself would minimize the evil in the world.67
A.

The Pure Voluntarist Position

This Section will argue that, although the voluntarist conception has
greater i n tu i ti v e appeal than the welfaris t conceptio n , it too face s
insurmountable obstacles to providing a complete explanation o f the defense. I n
particular, the voluntarist conception has difficulty explaining most of the core
requirements. It must also rej ect the two marginal requirements, although this
will appear to be a benefit if one seeks a basis for their rej ection.
The imminence requirement can be explained as an evidentiary condition
on the voluntari st account. The more time the coercer leaves between the
moment of the threat and the projected moment for carrying out the threat, the
higher the likelihood that the defendant will be in control of his actions when he
performs the illegal act. The requirement that the threat be of death or serious
bodily injury might be analyzed as an evidentiary condition as well : true loss of
control is not a likely result of threats of property damage. The stakes must be
extraordinarily high, and the actor must feel herself powerless to evade the
stark alternatives with which she is confronted before her claims of loss of
control will be credible. Arguably, threats of non-physical harm or of minor
bodily injury do not rise to this level .
It speaks against the evidenti ary expl anation of these requirements,
however, that they are irrebuttable . If the requirements were evidentiary i n
nature, the law would allow one to prove that one was overwhelmed in other
6 6.
Peop l e v. Luther, 232 N.W.2d 1 84 , 1 87 ( M i c h . 1 97 5 ) . The c o u r t in thi s c as e
outlined fou r requirements for the defense:
The threatening conduct was sufficient to create i n the mind of a
A)
reasonable person the fear of death or serious bodily harm;
The conduct i n fact caused such fear of death or serious bodily harm i n the
B)
min d of the defendant;
The fear o r duress was operating upon the mind o f the defendant at the
C)
time of the alleged act; and
The defendant �ommitted the act to avoid the threatened harm.
D)
!d. This fo1111 u lation of the defense, however, contains a reasonable person standard. The test is
thus not rigorou s l y subjective.
6 7 . The last two conditions of the Luther test together ensu re that the act was committed
because of the fear of death or serious bodily i nj ury . See id.
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sorts of circumstances. That is, on a thorough-going voluntarist conception, the
defense should be available for an idiosyncratic defendant with a particularly
low terror threshold. One might argue that rebuttable presumptions would be
impossible to administer with respect to these requirements. What would count
as sufficient evidence that a defendant had a particular sensitivity to the loss of a
certain material possession, for example? But even if rebuttable presumptions
are i nfeasible, it may not be desirable to tailor the use of the duress defense to
individu al peculiarities. Someone who robs a bank because he is out of his mind
with fear over the threatened loss of his new sports car should probably not be
able to claim the defense, no matter how great his attachment to his car.
These two requirements are thus perhaps better understood i n normative
terms, that is, as standards for loss of control that weaker defendants are
expected to meet. They communicate that an agent who does lose the exercise o f
her deliberative faculties for less does not have values that the law will protect.
The law need not accommodate exaggerated responses to threats of remote
harm or perverse attachments to material possessions.
The first and fifth requirements also seem more plausibly construed i n
normative terms. That the defendant had n o reasonable opportunity t o escape
from the coercive situation admits of a possible evidentiary interpretation: it is
perhaps implausible to think that the defendant would be out of control with
fear i f the defendant could simply have walked away from the situ ation. The
requirement is more sensibly construed as bearing on the reasonableness of a
defendant' s behavior in perfo rming the i llegal act. Whether the defendant
voluntarily placed herself in a situation in which she could expect to be coerced
is a particularly difficult requirement to construe as evidentiary . A defendant ' s
level o f fear is presumably unrelated to the way i n which she came to be subject
to coercion in the first place.
Voluntarists should reject the rule that duress is unavailable as a defense
to murder.68 If a person overcome by threats to his life submits to orders that
he take the life of another, although he cannot be praised, the loss of control
u nder the circumstances is exonerating, on this theory . The restricti o n ,
moreo ver, i s arguably incoherent on a psychological theory of the defense,
since a person is not more in control when he murders than when he commits a
lesser crime.69 Voluntarists should also reject the classic distinction between
natural and man-made threats, focusing instead entirely on state of mind. This
distinction is both illogical and unnecessary from a subj ective point of view:
iilogical because the core of the defense is a psychological state, rather than an
external circumstance, and unnecessary because duress and necessity are
distinguished from one another by the fact that one is an excuse and the other a
j u stificati o n . In addition, voluntarists should rej ect the other marginal
requirement for the defense, namely that the defendant' s behavior constitute
obedience to a direct order from a coercer. Fear-induced behavior should be
excused regardless of the specific relation between the threat and the actio n
performed. Not surprisingly, then, we find that proponents of the voluntarist
conception allow duress as a defense to prison escape under appropriate

68.
Some voluntarists seem indeed to rej ect the restriction. See FLETCHER, supra note
65, at 8 3 1 -3 3 .
59.
See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 1 2 , at 433 n . 4 .
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circumstances.70
B.

Hybrid Approaches

While a purely voluntarist rationale for the defense appears problematic,
tempering it with some obj ective elements greatly improves its plausibility. The
MPC provides a clear statutory example of a modified, or "hybrid," subj ective
approach. It solves the problem of idiosyncratic agents by adopti n g a
"reasonable person" standard on the question of ability to resist. Section 2 .09
defines duress as follows:
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged i n the conduct
charged to constitute a n offense because he was coerced to do so by the
use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person
of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in h is situation

would have been unable to resist. 7 1

As discussed i n the Explanatory Note to this Code S ection , the
requirement that the "person of reasonable firmness" have been unable to resist
is an obj ective element. The psychological nature of the approach, however,
remains in the fact that the exonerating element is the agent' s inability to resist.
Whether the agent does the right thing in not resisting is i rrelevant, as i s shown
by the fact that Section 3 .02, which sets out the basic lesser evils defense, i s not
limited to situations in which nature is the source of the choice. If S ection 2 . 09
were a lesser evils provision, Section 3 .02 would be redundant. Assuming it i s
n o t redundant, Section 2.09 must cover situations in which the actor cannot
j ustify his conduct o n lesser evils grounds, but in which his behavior must still
be excused. As the Commentary to Section 2.09 says,
The problem of S ection 2.09 . . reduces to the question of whether there
.

are cases where the actor cannot j ustify his conduct under Section 3 .02,
as when his choice involves an equal or greater evil than that threatened,
but where he nonetheless should be excused because he was subj ected
to coercion.

The reasonableness standard is a familiar way to cope with variations in
individual fortitude when a provision' s basic approach is psychological . B ut its
importance underscores the inability of the psychological theory to provide a
c o mp l e te rationale for the defense. The voluntarist t h e ory combined with a
reasonableness condition makes a unified rationale for the defense impossible. It
will be recalled that the possibility of accounting for the defense in terms of
multiple rationales has already been rej ected. 7 2 The approach i s therefore
theoretically unsatisfying. The sought-for unity of explanation would be
maintained if the reasonableness standard were an evidentiary rule. B u t first, as
discussed above, such a rule would have to be rebuttable to be consistent with
the vol untarist rationale. Second, the defense probably should not be e xtended
to idiosyncratic agents. There is thus a normative aspect to the reasonableness
standard which the evidentiary rationale fai l s to c a p t ure
.

A further problem with the MPC approach, however, is that there is a
risk that duress will collapse into the conditions which negate the basic elements
of the crime.73 Many of the conditions which undermine th e act requirement of
70.
71.

72.

73.

See People v . Luther, 232 N . W . 2d. i 84 ( M ich. 1 9 7 5 ) ; see also supra notes
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09( ! ) ( 1 980) (emphasis added).
See supra Part L
\'his i s also a probiem with "pure" voluntarist theories.
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the criminal law proceed by negating the voluntariness of the actor' s behavior,
and negation of voluntariness is also the core of the voluntarist approach to
duress. On the voluntarist conception, duress exonerates because it eliminates
the actor' s power of choice, much in the same way that having one ' s hand
closed around the handle of a knife by another eliminates choice. But as the
Commentary to MPC Section 2.09 say s :
I f [the actor] is s o far overwhelmed b y force that h i s behavior is
involuntary, as when his arm is physically moved by someone else,
Section 2.01 ( 1 ) stands as a barrier to liability, following in this respect the
long tradition of the penal law. The case of concern here is that in which
the actor makes a choice, but claims in his defense that he was so
intimidated that he was unable to choose otherwise. S hould such
psychological incapacity be given the same exculpative force as the
physical incapacity that may afford a defense under Section 2.0 1 ?
A s the above passage makes clear, the problem i s that the actus reus
requirement found in MPC Section 2.01 covers the condition of an agent who
acts, but who acts involuntarily, and Section 2 . 0 1 gives no i ndication that it is
meant to cover the case of coercion. The forms of involuntary behavior l isted
in that section are limited to reflex movements or convul sions, bodily
movements made while unconscious or during sleep, behavior under hypnosis,
or bodily movements that are "not a product of the effort or determination of
the actor, either conscious or habituaJ . "74 Arguably the kind of involuntariness
duress creates is somewhat different, and although Section 2.0 1 can perhaps
provide an analogy, it is not itself meant to cover such cases. The Commentary
supports this interpretation. The problem, however, is that it is not clear what
other sort of involuntari ness there can be, that i s , what non-physical
involuntariness might mean.
Fletcher' s answer to this question in vokes the notion of n ormative
involuntari n e s s . 7 5 His approach is a hybrid voluntarist conception, since it
combines the basic voluntarist rationale for the defense with a normative
element. According to Fletcher, the movements of a person whose hand is
forcibly closed around the handle of a knife are involuntary in a physical sense.
The ordinary cases of duress we have been considering, however, are examples
of normative or moral i nvoluntariness. Fletcher does not explore how one
might determine when conduct is involuntary in a moral , as opposed to a
physical sense, except that u nlike physical involu ntari n e s s , n o rmative
involuntariness "depends in a curious way on the competing interests as in cases
of justification."76 He concludes that when "the gap between the harm done and
the benefit accrued becomes too great, the act is more l i kely to appear
voluntary and therefore inexcusabl e . " ?? A person cannot claim that he is
coerced by threats that his finger will be broken into destroying the rest of the
w o rl d . 7 8 On the other hand, Fletcher says, "conduct may be perceived as
morally involuntary even though the cost is substanti ally greater than the

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2 . 0 l (2)(d) ( 1 9 80).
74.
75 .
FLETCHER, supra note 6 5 , at 803 .
76 .
!d. ; see also George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 4 7
S . CAL L . REV. 1 26 9 , 1 27 6 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . ("Whether conduct appears to be i nvoluntary depends, i n
part, on t h e competing interests a t stake . " ) .
77 .
FLETCHER, supra note 6 5 , at 8 04 .
78.
!d.
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benefi t gained."79 The example h e gives is o f a person who kills another i n
order to avoid mutilation o f h i s o w n body. He points o u t correctly that w e are
often excused in the latter sort of case according to common noti o n s o f
morality. This is clearly a result the welfarist conception cannot support.
While Fletcher' s classification of the cases is supported by the ethical
judgments we make about them, the fact that we regard a defendant threatened
with a b roken finger as fully culpable and a defendant threatened with
mutilation as blameless does not imply that the cases should be distinguished
from one another by the concept of "voluntariness." That we blame in the
former case d o e s entail that we regard the act as voluntary , but that w e
exonerate i n the latter case does n o t entail lac k of voluntari n e s s . The
involuntariness of killing to avoid mutilation would have to be established on
independent grounds, and "dependence on competing interests" is u nlikely to
supply those grounds.
It is the c ontention of thi s Article that duress does not involve
i nvoluntariness of any sort. The clear examples of physical involuntari n ess
reflex motions, epileptic seizures, having one ' s limbs moved by someone else
are irrelevant for understanding coerced behavior. Individuals whose physical
movements are controlled by forces outside themselves, or outside their
conscious minds, cannot conceivably choose to behave otherwise. Although a
person acting because she fears for her life may feel as though she has no
c ontrol over whether to do the act, she surely controls the act in precisely the
way that she controls non-coerced movements . This is what is entailed by
saying she performs the act intentionally in both cases. Furthermore, there is
little doubt that responses to coercion can be affected by training. Soldiers may
Jearn to increase their resistance to torture, and they may even learn to accept
death rather than to betray the values for which they are fighti n g . Reflex
movements and epileptic seizures, on the other hand, are unlikely to be affected
by training.
It appears, then, that the voluntarist rationale cannot explain the basic
elements of the defense, since that theory cannot be sensibly maintained without
interj ecting certain normative elements. A mixed account of this sort, among its
other drawbacks, does not satisfy the condition of theoretical unity which has
been this Article ' s obj ective. What is required is a single conceptual framework
that can accommodate both normative and psychological elements.
V. DURESS AND THE N ATURE OF R E S PONSIBILITY
The welfarist and the voluntarist conceptions depend on the s am e basic
account of responsibility. B oth assume that what a person does i ntentionally is
necessarily an appropriate obj ect of moral assessment. Exoneratio n i s only
possible, therefore, if the thi ng done intentionally turns out to be good,
meaning that it brings about an improvement in the social welfare.
To spell out the common assumption of the two conceptions, we might
say they are committed to the following Principle of Responsibility (call it
"PR" ) : An agent is morally responsible for everything she does intentionally. In
other words, agents are morally responsible for all the i ntended consequences
of their intentional actions. PR has no bearing on situations in which an agent is
79.

!d. at 803 .

!

i
J

1
j

1 995]

FINKELSTEIN

271

held morally responsible for things she did not do intentionally. That is, neither
of the standard views assumes that agents are responsible for all and only their
i ntentional doings. What P R does do is severely restrict the grounds for
exonerating an agent for the bad consequences she i ntends : the only basis for
exonerating intentional conduct is j usti fication. It follows that one can only
avoid blame for a socially inefficient act if the thing done was not done
intentionall y . It is in virtue of their commitment to PR, then, that the standard
theories limit the withholding of blame for the violation of a prohibitory norm
to situations in which the behavior is either j ustified or involuntary.
The term "responsibility" is a nebulous one. In the context of PR , the
expression has moral connotations. That is, it incorporates the upshot of a
moral inquiry into the characterization of the relation between the agent and the
thing she does. The moral usage is a common one. We often say someone is not
"responsible" for an occurrence, when what we mean is that, although she
brought it about on purpose, she is not to b lame. What often goes u nrecognized,
however, is that we sometimes use the term to characterize a non-moral
relation between an agent and one of her doings. This should be clear from the
fact that we can say an agent i s responsible for something she did in a case in
which the thing done is morally neutral, that is, when the action or consequence
is neither good nor bad. When we say, for example, that someone went for a
walk, or brushed her teeth, or pulled up her socks, we understand the agent as
responsible for what she does, but we do not, in the usual case, regard her as
subject to praise or blame for it. The question of moral evaluation simply does
not arise. The expression "responsibility" should be taken to signify the non
moral agency relation that holds prior to moral judgment between an agent and
certain of her actions, whereas the expression "moral responsibility" should be
understood as referring to the upshot of moral evaluation. The thesis of this
Article might therefore be put as the claim that the gap between responsibility
and mora l responsibility allows for an extension of the concept of excuse:
excused conduct should include cases in which the agent is responsible for what
she does in the non-moral sense and leave to one side cases in which the agent is
responsible in the moral sense.
Another way to understand the suggestion of this Article is that we ought
to drive a wedge between the notions of intentional action and moral
responsibility . That is, doing something intentionally should not be thought to
entail mora l responsibility for the thing done . Once this is understood, a space
opens up in which a revised conception of excuse can operate: someone can
have an excuse for fully intentional conduct, despite the fact that the thing she
did is not something she was justified in doing. Duress, then, is indeed an
excuse, but, it will be suggested, the concept of excuse should not be restricted
to lack of responsibility . Instead, blame can be withheld from a responsible
agent without that agent having adopted the best course of action under the
circumstances. An individual can perform a bad act and yet not be culpable,
even though his behavior was fully intentional.
This middle road incorporates some of the benefi ts of each of the
surroundin g alternatives. On the one hand, it recognizes the relevance of
psychological features . On the other hand, it provides the central advantage of
the welfarist conception in recognizing that agents acting under duress exercise
choice. The bank robbery performed on pain of death , for example, may
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require an extended period o f planning and a significant exercise of deliberative
rati onality. Indeed, what the coercer does is to appeal to the delib erative
faculties of the defendant: the coercer provides the defendant with p articularly
strong reasons for acting, and when the defendant complies, he acts for those
reasons. The resulting action performed under duress i s thus fully i ntentional,
since it i s action done for a reason. so
The proposed approach al s o makes sense of a number of the
requirements of the defense. On this view , it is coherent to restrict the plea to
actions performed i n protection of particularly strong interests, such as o ne ' s
i nterest i n one' s own life and bodily security and those o f loved ones. It may be
excusable that people protect loved ones in situations in which the same actions
would not be excusable if undertaken on behalf of strangers . The asymmetry
between loved ones and strangers can be maintained because actions that are
permissible, on this view, need only be u nderstandable. They need n o t be
morally c ommendable. In addition, unreasonable p references-such as a
preference for expending a human life to save a material possessio n-need not
be accommodated, even if the same sense of urgency affects the actor i n that
case as it does another, less peculiar actor threatened with death or serious
bodily inj ury. This is because the approach i s normative, albeit normative i n a
weak sense, based on a descriptive theory of psychological normality .
Other requirements-that the defendant have had no opportun i ty to
escape from the situation, that the threat was imminent, and that the defe ndant
not have placed herself voluntarily in a s ituation in which she could expect to be
coerced-can be explained as features of the situation that bear on whether the
actor' s behavior was u nderstandable under the circumstances. The last of these
requirements in particular affects whether the defendant appears deservin g of
our sympathy: agents who join criminal organizations in some sense "assume
the risk" of their activities . We are disinclined to believe that performing a
criminal act is anathema to them. In this case, the act seems consistent w i th a
negative view of the agent, since there is no basis for regarding i t as an
exceptional event in the life of an otherwise moral person.
Consider now how the proposed approach would apply to cases of
mistake. Where a defendant reasonably but mistakenly believes she has a valid
duress defense, her conduct is excu sed . The same character considerations that
exonerate agents in duress cases where no mistake is made apply to the mistaken
actor. And since duress is already an excuse, on this view, rather than a
j ustification, there is no reason to analyze cases of this sort under the heading of
"mistake" rather than "duress," as there is on the welfarist conception.
The second sort of mi stake case is also unproblematic on the proposed
view. Where a defendant is unaware of the existence of an excuse, there can be
no exoneration in this case: no pressure operates on the mind of the defendant,
and therefore character considerations have no opportunity to arise.
The jurisprudential obstacle to expressing the character view of duress in
a legal standard is that Anglo-American law l acks a conceptual niche for a
defense conceived i n the suggested way. The traditional excuses--i n sanity,
mistake, etc .-impugn the defendant' s agency . In other words, excuses in our
system tend to negative culpability by deny ing voluntariness. It is because
80.
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j ustifi cation i s the only current theory of exoneration that Anglo-American law
takes refuge i n welfarist rationales for a legal rule such as duress. It i s not
surprising, then, that the welfarist conception of duress is the more prevalent of
the two standard theories in the legal literature.
C onsider, by way of contrast, the defense of "excusing necessity" found
in Section 35 of the Gerrnan Criminal Code. This Section provides:
Whoever commits an unlawful act in order to prevent a present danger
to the l i fe, limb or liberty of himself, a relative or a close person acts
without guilt. However this does not apply if under the circumstances,
and i n particular if he has brought about the danger or has a special legal
obligation, the perpetrator shoul d be expected to c ope w i th the
danger . 8 1

The provision clearly does not advance a j ustificati o n : i t exonerates
agents under the specified conditions without regard to social welfare. Under
the terms of the provision, an individual could take a life to save himself from
death or serious bodily inj u ry . The defense is nevertheless not predicated on
involuntariness. That the approach is not concerned with voluntariness emerges
clearly in the last sentence of the quoted passage: where the perpetrator cannot
fairly be expected to c ope, his behavior need not be involuntary , and
conversely, where the perpetrator can fairly be expected to cope, his behavior
need not be voluntary . A person might decide in a cool moment, for example,
that he simply would not be able to cope with seeing a loved one killed. He
realizes that it would induce madness, or that it would simply be unbearable. He
takes rational measures to avoid the eventuality ; these need not be involuntary
simply because he acts in fear. While the possibility of voluntary behavior
presumably provides a necessary but not sufficient condition for the fairness of
requiring a person to stand firm in the face of a threat, the two concepts are
analytically distinct.
What it is reasonable to expect of a person depends on various non
psychological, or social factors, such as the rol e the defendant plays in society.
A fireman, for example, may rightfully be regarded as having assumed special
duties that require her to refrain from acting on highly personal preferences in
certain ci rcumstances . s2 A state actor may be required to act w ith a n eye
towards the social welfare alone . B u t the private actor will not usually b e
condemned for preferring his own welfare and the welfare o f those w ith whom
he has special bonds over the welfare of strangers . Although the German
approach is at least pa rti a lly psychological , it differs from the highly subj ective
approaches to duress encountered sometimes in American j u ri sprudence in that
it does not require the agent to have lost control or to lack the c ap a c i ty to
confom1 her behavior to the l a w .
The German approach also obviates the n e ed to disti nguish situations
caused by natural forces from those c aused by human forces, s i nce there is a
non-artificial way to distinguish duress from necessity . The Gennan Code, for
example, includes all n eces s i ty and duress defenses wh ere the conduct is
exonerating, but not commendable, u n de r the personal necessity provision o f
Secion 35. It reserves another section, number 34, for similar s i t u a ti o n s where
8 I .

STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] § 3 5 (f. R . G . ) (translation in Albin Eser,
24 AM. . J. COivl P . L . 62 i , 636-37 n. 8 1 ( 1 976)).
See E s e r , supra note 8 1 , at 6 36-3 7.
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the defense is a j ustification, rather than an excuse. Section 34 is a proper lesser
evils defense. It reads:
Whoever in a present and otherwise not preventable danger to life , limb,
liberty, honor, property or any other legal interest acts to prevent the
d amage to be inflicted on himself or another person, does not act
unl awfully if the balance of the conflicting interests, in particular the
legal interest involved and the intensity o f the imminent danger, shows
that the defended interest is entitled to prevail over the one which is
i n frin ged . This is admissible, however, only in so far as the act is an
adequate means for preventing the damage.s3

Unlike Section 35, this section allows a defendant to claim the defense for
actions performed to protect any legal interest. It is thus a consistent application
of the lesser evils defense. Its operation in conj u nc tion with S ecti o n 35 is
c oherent, moreover, since behavior u ndertaken under the defense provided by
S ec tion 34, which turns out to be mistaken, may be excusable under S ection
3 5 . 84 The lesser evils defense only j ustifies behavior which is in fact socially
beneficial. Since behavior excused under Section 35 might also be welfare
maximizing, some cases would presumably be covered by both provisions. The
n atural division among cases, however, is for criminal acts performed for the
sake of compelling personal interests to be defended under Section 3 5 , and for
those performed by actors with no personal stake to fall under Section 34.
In an article on excuse, George Fletcher comp ares our legal system
unfavorably to the German system. ss He criticizes Anglo-American law for
failing to make a place for "individualized" excusing conditio n s , that is,
conditions that do not stem from the application of a legal rule, and which take
seriously "differences among persons and situations."S6 Common law courts, in
his opinion, "have been loath to recognize necessity , duress, insanity and
mistake of law as defenses relating to the character of the doer rather than to
the quality of the deed," with the result that " [n]ecessity and duress sometimes
emerge as j ustifi c atory defenses . . . , as claims that the act is right and
commendable, rather than that the actor should be disassociated from wrongful
c o n d u c t . " 8 7 He argues that German l aw i s quite different on q uestions of
culpability :
[T]he contemporary German style of thought stresses the centrality of
codificati on and legislative supremacy i n defining prohibited conduct.
Yet at the lev'=! of assessing individual culpability, the German courts
culti vate a s y stem o f individualized excusing conditi o n s . T h e
indispensable inquiry in every c a s e is whether t h e defendant, a s a
concrete individual, can be fairly blamed for having violated the law . 88

At least where duress is concerned, Fletcher' s argument that courts
should focus on the i ndividual seems correct. Focusing on the individual ,
however, does not imply that the excusi n g condi tion must itself be
"individualized," namely not subj ect to application by a rule. The notion of
83.
StGB § 3 4 (translation i n Eser, supra note 8 1 , at 634 n . 6 5 ) .
84.
Recal l , howe ver, that there i s a difference i n scope between the t w o p ro v i s i o n s .
B eh avior which the actor mistakenly believed t o be covered by § 34 would not be c o vered by §
3 5 if it were undertaken to guard against an e v il less serious than death or serious bodily i nj u ry .
8 5.
See generally Fletcher, supra note 7 6 .
86.
!d. a t 1 3 00 .
87.
!d. at 1 2 7 2 .
88.
/d. a t 1 3 00-0 1 .
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governance by legal principle, rather than by ad hoc commands of a ruler,
requires that courts or legislatures fashion and publicize rules, and proceed to
apply them as fairly as possible. The difficult question is what kind of rule we
should have to govern exoneration, not whether or not to have rules. A rule
governed theory need not be impersonal or ignore character traits: personal or
psychological features can be incorporated i nto rules as easily as obj ective or
normative conditions . The only l i mits to tying legal rules to mentalistic
elements are evidentiary, but there i s no a priori reason for excluding such
features from rules.
It is also important to realize that one need not equate the personalized
with the subj ective. A defense c an be personal to the actor without being
strongly psychological. For example, good character i s personal to the actor,
but a rule that turned on it would not depend on the presence or absence of
occurrent psychological states . One might, therefore, attempt to push Anglo
American jurisprudence further than Fletcher does and reject the idea that the
only way to focus on the doer, rather than on the deed, i s to discover
psychological peculiarities of an agent that negate culpability. It i s possible for a
personalized defense focusing on doers rather than on deeds to w arrant
exoneration on normative grounds.
VI. THE ROLE OF D ISPOS ITIONS
The previous Part pointed i n the direction of a different approach to
duress . It did not, however, explore why an actor who acts under duress should
be excused. This Part argues that we excuse actors who perform criminal acts
under duress because the decision to bring about harm in such cases stems from
accepted dispositions, dispositions that are constitutive of human nature, at least
for virtuous agents.
People who have good dispositions, and who attach value to the things
they should value, may encou nter situations i n which continuing to act
according to their dispositions will lead them to harmful acts. Suppose they
form attachments to family and friends. These attachments are generally
applauded. Indeed, something more can be said about such dispositions, which
is that they seem to lie at the heart of what it is to be a person. This
fundamental disposition, or set of dispositions, creates an asymmetry in the
obligations to which we hold one another. That we form attachments, for
example, makes strangers seem less deserving of our time and energy than
those with whom we hold special bonds. A similar story can be told about self
preservation. People generally prefer their own preservation to that of others,
at least others with whom they do not have special bonds . This i s not a
disposition we seek to eliminate. Having nurtured and protected the
development of these strong asymmetric commitments, we will be unable to
abandon them in rare, unexpected situations in which it might be better from
the standpoint of the general social welfare to act contrary to the disposition.
Because we recognize and identify with these dispositions, we excuse agents in
c ases in which their otherwise wrongful acti ons follow directly from
dispositions of this sort .
This idea may be a t the core o f Aristotle ' s account o f duress, although his
remarks on the subject are all too brief. In the Nicomachean Eth ics, Ari stotle
says that acti ons performed under duress are ones in which a person performs a
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forbidden action "under pressure which overstrains human nature and which n o
o n e could withstand." 8 9 By "human nature" h e means the dispositions of choice
and patterns of behavior that are distinctively characteristic of human beings . If
we know anything about Aristotle' s views of human l ife, we know two things:
first, that all human action aims at "happiness,"90 and second, that human beings
are characteristically "political , " meaning that they realize their good i n
association with others.91 It follows that the end o f human action i s one' s own
well-being and the well-being of one ' s family and friends. It thus "overstrains
human nature" to require human beings to refrain from acts on which the most
essential human ends depend.
One might wish to object that Aristotl e ' s point must be about involuntary
behavior, since failure to "withstand" pressure might simply mean giving i n to
irresistible impul ses. What else could it mean for a person to respond to
pressure which "overstrains human nature," other than that the person cannot
control her response to the threat? But j ust as the German rule presupposes a
distinction between i nvoluntary action and inability to cope, the n otion of
overstraining human nature need not be cashed out in terms of involuntariness
either. Aristotle' s more general ethical philosophy offers us a conception of
responsibility which explains why this is so.
For Aristotle, the category of voluntary action i s a broad one. It includes
acts of animals and children as well as adult action.9 2 There are two types of
voluntary action: action which follows deliberation, which stems from choice,93
and action which is not preceded by deliberation. Aristotle draws the distinction
by saying: "Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the
voluntary ; the latter extends more widely. For both children and the other
animals share in voluntary action, but not in choice . . . . "94 The actions of
children and animals are voluntary, but they do not stem from choice.
Aristotle also says that voluntary actions are subj ect to praise and blame,
and that involuntary actions are not. Those actions are voluntary which are not
rendered involuntary by either compulsion or ignorance.95 Compulsion obtains
when "the moving principle is outside" the agent.96 Aristotle explains this as "a
principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or i s
feeling the passion, e . g . if h e were t o b e carried somewhere by a w i n d , or b y

8 9.
A RISTOT LE, Nicomachean Ethics, i n THE COLLECTED W ORKS O F A R ISTOTLE §
1 1 1 0(a)(25) (Jonathan B arnes ed., 1 984) [hereinafter NE].
!d. § 1 097(b)(20). "Happiness" i s the standard translation of "eudaimonia."
90.
9l.
Aristotle says "man i s by nature a political animal ." ARISTOTLE, Politics, in TH E
COLLECTED WORKS OF A RISTOTLE § 1 1 1 0(a)(25) (Jonathan B arnes e d . , 1 984).
NE, supra note 8 9 , § l l l l (b) (7-9 ) .
92.
93 .
Vol untary action that is not the product of choice i s the product of a p p e ti te or
passion. I t i s considerati ons such as these that lead Aristotle to the conclusion that " . . . the
voluntary [is] not. . . defined either by desire or by choice." ARISTOTLE. Eudemian Ethics, i n THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ARISTOTLE § 1 22 5 (b)( l ) (Jonathan B arnes ed., 1 984). Neither appetite
nor deliberation is part of the definition o f voluntariness, implying that n either acting on an
appetite nor failing to deliberate prior to performing an action renders an act involuntary.
94.
NE, supra note 89, § l l l l (b) (7- 1 0).
95.
In the Magna Moralia, however, Aristotle treats compulsion as the only condition that
renders an act involuntary : "Roughly speaking, that is voluntary which we do when n ot u nder
c ompu l s i o n . " A RISTOTLE, lv!agna Mora lia, in THE C OLLECTED W ORKS OF A R I S T O T L E §
1 1 8 7 (b)(35) (Johnathan B arnes e d . , 1 984).
96.
NE, supra note 8 9 , § l l ! O( a ) ( l -2 ) .
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men who had him i n their power. "97 Ignorance, sometimes translated as
"error," falls i nto several different categories, not all of which exempt an
action from praise and blame. The kind of ignorance that makes an action
i nvol untary is i gnorance o f parti c u l ars, which is i g norance o f the
"circumstances of the action and the obj ects with which it i s concerned."98 It
follows that the actions of animal's and children are subj ect to praise and blame,
as long as they are not caused by something outside the agent and there is no
ignorance of the particulars surrounding the act.
It also seems to follow that acti o n s performed u nder duress are
voluntary, and that they are therefore subj ect to praise and blame. The actors in
such cases make no perceptual mistake, and the movements they make are
initiated by them, i . e . , the acts are not caused by an external force . The few
remarks Aristotle makes on duress confirm thi s reading. He says that although
actions of thi s sort are "mixed," the person who performs them acts
voluntarily, "for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in
such actions is in [the man,] and the things of which the moving principle is in a
man himself are in his power to do or not to do."99
Although Ari stotle makes his position reasonably clear, some
commentators do not believe that Aristotle could have meant what he said.
Terry Irwin, for example, concedes that Aristotle treats the voluntary as
s u fficient for responsibility, but he nevertheless thinks i t obvious that
responsibility is more closely tied to rational agency than this equation of
responsibility with the voluntary suggests, and equally obvious that Aristotle
agrees. 1 oo Aristotle, according to Irwin, is confused by his own lights, thinki ng
"he has found a criterion for responsible action when he seems to have found
only a criterion for voluntary action . " l O l Assuming that Aristotle meant to
"connect[] responsibility more closely with rational agency," 102 Irwin attempts
to show that Aristotle actually "takes responsible action to require something
more than these minimal conditions . " l 03 But nothing more i s in fact required,
and it is a mistake to try to rewrite Aristotle on this point.
Aristotle' s understanding of the voluntary is not inadequate to ground the
non-moral notion of responsibility presented above. l 04 His account of the
voluntary is only too minimal if it is treated as a foundation for the moral sense
of the term. But, as discussed in Part V, to say that an action is voluntary , or to
say that an agent is responsible for a certain occurrence, is not to make a moral
j udgment. It is instead to make a j udgment that the agent satisfies a threshold
condition for moral j udgment, that is, she has caused somethin g to happen
which she must own. This is to say no more than that she has done something
for a reason , where the reason is explanatory of her behavior. As discussed
97.
!d. § 1 1 1 0(a) (2-4 ) .
ld. § 1 1 1 0(b) (33-34).
98.
99.
!d. § 1 1 1 O(a) ( 1 1 - 1 7 ) . While it is clear that Aristotle rejects a voluntarist account of
duress, i t is slightly more difficult to show that he rej ects a lesser evils rational e . The strongest
direct e vidence for this stems from the fact that the lesser evils rationale does not cover all cases
in which agents should be e xonerated, according to Aristotl e . He says that " [o]n some actions
praise indeed is not bestowed, but forgiveness i s . " Jd. § l ! I O(a) (23-24).
TERENCE H . IRWIN, ARISTOTLE ' S FIRST PRINCIPLES § 1 82 ( 1 9 8 8 )
1 00.
101.
!d.
1 02. !d.
1 03.
id.
1 04.
See supra Part Y .
. .
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above, ws to say that a n agent does something for a reason is t o say that she does
the thing intentionally . It is the mere fact that an agent acts for a reason that
determines whether the thing done is done intentionally. The content of the
reason is irrelevant. It is only once it i s clear that a person h as acted
intentionally that we can call her to account for what she has done. Whether we
regard her as culpable will depend o n the content of the reaso n she gives.
Responsibility, then, in the non-moral sense turns only on the fo rm of the
action: the action must be something the agent did for a reason in order for the
agent to be responsible for it. Moral responsibility, by contrast, requires more.
It requires that we regard the c o n t e n t of the agent' s reason for acting as
inadequate to excuse or to j ustify her conduct.
The distinction between moral and non-moral forms of responsibility
also sheds brighter light on Aristotle' s comments about praise and blame. When
he says that all voluntary action is subject to praise and blame, he does not mean
praise and blame to be understood as varieties of moral responsibility . Moral
assessment, unlike praise and blame, pertains to human character. It is not
applicable to individual acts, even acts which reflect choice. There are thus two
kinds of judgment at issue: j udgment of action and j udgment of character, or to
be more precise, j udgment of agents in light of their actions and j udgment of
agents in light of their characters.
Judgment of agents in light of their actions is strictly speaking non-moral
in form. It is the means by which the moral capacities are developed, since at
least in human beings, praising and blaming actions will issue in states of
c haracter. Character, as Aristotle says, i s acquired "from the exercise of
activities on particular objects," I 06 that is, through the performance of actions
of a certain kind. Human beings will presumably perform actions more often
when they are rewarded for them, and will cease to perform those for which
they are punished. The repeated performance of virtuous action thus leads to
the development of a virtuous character, and likewise with vice. In short, the
ethical capacities of persons are acquired through habituation, and praise and
blame are devices for encouraging the performance of good actio n s and
discouraging the performance of bad actions. Praise and blame are thus not
themselves varieties of moral assessment.
Moral assessment, by contrast, is a j udgment about the state of a pe rs on ' s
character, taken as a whole. This applies only to beings capable of choice, and
thus animals and children below a certain age cannot be judged as agents .
Character-judgment is ethical in nature, since agents with developed characters
are moral agents . They can be j udged as good or bad persons in toto.
Derivative from this second sort of evaluation is a notion of moral j udgment of
agents for their actions: actions acquire their ethical quality from the \vay in
which they depend on and reveal the ethical constitution of agents . But this type
of evaluation is only appropriate if ( 1 ) the being in question is a being w i th a
character, an d (2) the action i n virtue of w h i c h the agent is being j udged is
itself reflective of choice . T h e most important element of t h i s conceptio n for
our purposes has to do with this last point: that an action is reflective of choice
means t h at the action i s part i c u l a rly revel atory of the agen t ' s ch aracter. As
Aristotle says, choice is "thought to be most closely bound up w ith virtue and t o
1 05 .
1 06 .

See supra text accompanying note 80.
supra note 89, § 1 1 14(a) (5-6).
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discriminate characters better than actions do . " I 07 We examine chosen action ,
then, in order t o learn something about the chooser' s character.
On an Aristotelian conception, we can understand duress in the following
way . A person acting under duress performs an action which, prima facie,
merits a negative j udgment. This j udgment indicates the appropriateness of
punishment. But the prima facie judgment is inaccurate in the case of an action
performed under duress, because a j udgment of character supersedes the act
based j udgment. There is thus a failure of implication from bad act to bad
character. Although the action performed under duress is of a type to result in
poor character formation and thus would normally require discouragement
through punishment, the dispositions in the service of which the action is
performed make a different sort of j udgment applicable. Dispositions of the
agent, such as love of family and friends or a strong commitment to self
preservation, transfer to the action in the derivative sense explained above, and
the action can thus be j udged as a reflection of character, rather than as an
isolated act. B ecause the person who acts under duress is revealed as acting in
harmony with his good dispositions i n a case of duress, the badness of the act
does not require the normal pedagogic response.
The usual danger of inculcating bad dispositions by allowing or failing to
punish bad acts can fail to apply, then, because human beings with developed
characters, and a clear conception of the good, will not have their characters
influenced by acts which already stem from a firmly developed disposition. The
bad act is excused, because it fol lows from the good disposition. Animals and
chil dren, by contrast, could not be excused in this fashion, since they d ev elop
dispositions of a very different sort. B ad acts will always contribute to bad
dispositions for them, since acts turn rigidly into dispositions solely in virtue of
repeated performance. The absence of character formation, and with it, the
absence of the faculty of choice, means that there is nothing to stand between
the act and the development of a disposition to act in the way dictated by the
disposition. One is left with praise and blame, reward and punishment. Ethical
assessment, therefore, applies only to human conduct.
It is sometimes said that actions performed under duress should be
excused because the usual inference from conduct to character cannot be made.
Fletcher, for example, puts the point thus:
The distinguishing feature of excusing conditions is that they preclude
an inference from the act to the actor' s character. Typically, if a bank
teller opens a safe and turns money over to a stranger, we can infer that
he is dishonest. B ut if he does a l l this at gunpoint, we cannot infer
anything one way or the other about his honesty . 1 0 8

The account presented in this Article reverses Fletcher' s analysis. In the
normal case of punishment, there is little or no attention paid to character. We
do not punish an act because we think the actor evil. We punish the act because
the act is wrong, even if the actor i s a good person. Duress appe ars as a n
I 07.
!d. § 1 1 1 1 (b) (5-6). For a general d i scussion of the distinction between judgment o f
character and j udgment of actions, see Claire Finkel stein, Tort La w as a Comparative Institution:
Reply to Perry, 1 5 HARV. J. LAW & P U B . POL ' Y 939, 950 ( 1 992).
I 08.
FLETCHER, supra note 6 5 , at 799-800. H e goes on to say that "the same breakdo''ifl
in the reasoning from conduct to character occurs i n cases of insanity . " !d. He thus believes
that this is a feature that characterizes excuses generally . B u t with at least some sons of i n s an i ty ,
it seems difficult to speak of an underlying character which is preserved.
. .
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exception, a case in which w e p u t the act-j udgment t o one side because of a
countervailing character-judgment. What follows is a suspension of punishment,
or an exo n e ra ti o n of the agent, which the agent receives as a spec ial
dispensation for acting on good motives. Allowing character judgment to enter
i nto the practice of punishment is the exception, rather than the rule. Most of
the other excuses do pertain to voluntariness, and the conventional w isdom
about the irrelevance of character should continue to apply to those cases.
At least two other defenses, however, appear to lend themselves to a
character-based analysis: provocation suggests that the defendant' s violent
reaction is at least partially understandable, although not commendable, i n light
of the extraordinary situation in which he found himself. A relatively virtuous
person might react badly when confronted with pressures of an unusual n ature.
Like duress, p rovocation has often been treated as a defense b as ed o n
i nvoluntarines s . 109 Entrap:•1ent i :; n o w explicitly treated as a character-related
defense, since, under the prevailing "subj ective standard," the government must
prove the defendant was "predisposed" to perform the criminal act it i nduced
him to perform. 1 1 0 In addition, the defenses of battered women' s syndrome 1 1 1
and black rage 1 1 2 might also derive more support from character considerations
than from the idea that the agent' s conduct i s involuntary.
The foregoing analysis suggests certain conclusions about the distinction
between excuse and j ustification generall y . Instead of distinguishing excuse
from j ustification by the difference between involuntary and commendable
conduct, the distinction lies in the stance society takes to the offender: where the
basis for the defense is that the actor behaved understandably , given her
personal stake in the situation, we excuse, even though the behavior is not
commendable. Where the actor' s own interests are not implicated, by contrast,
we exonerate only where the behavior is justified, since the act enhances social
utility . Although an actor can increase the general level of utility even where
personal interests are at stake, in such cases the actor' s reason for violating the
prohibitory norm is the act ' s effects on the actor' s own interests. The actor does
not violate the prohibitory norm in order to improve social welfare . In short,
where the reason for violating the prohibitory norm is agent- relative , 1 1 3 that is,
identified by its connection to the interests of the person whose reaso n it is, we
demand only acceptance and understanding as a bas i s for exoneration. B y
contrast, where the reason is agent-neutral, 1 1 4 that is, formulated for agents
1 09 .
See M ichael S . M oore, Causation and the Excuses, 7 3 CAL. L. REV. 1 09 1 , 1 1 49
( 1 9 8 5 ). But see Joshua Dres<1 er, Rc:.'zinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Searc h of a
Rationale, 73 J. C RIM. L. 42 1 , 462 ( 1 9S2).
1 1 0.
Mathev,;s v . United States, 4 8 5 U . S . 58 ( 1 98 8 ) . Commentators, however, i n s i s t on
regarding entraped behavior as in voluntary . See George P . Fletcher, Paradoxes in Lega l
Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV . 1 26 3 , 1 28 0 ( 1 9 8 5 ) .
1 1 1.
See S tate v. Pascal, 7 3 6 P . 2d 1 064, 1 07 1 -7 2 (Wash. 1 9 8 7 ) (treat i n g battered
women' s syndrome as operating in mitigation of punishment based on diminished capacity ) ; see
genera l ly Anne '
I v1 . Cou ghl i n , Excusing Women, 8 2 C A L . L . R E V . l ( 1 9 9 4 ) (criticizing
diminished capacity approaches to the battered woman syndrome defense).
1 1 2 . See S tate v. Lamar, 698 P.2d 7 3 5 , 74 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 984) (rej ec ting the d e fense
of "black rage").
1 13.
Agent-relative reasons make essential reference to the person whose reason it i s ,
whereas agent-neutrai reasons do not. See D E REK PARFIT , REASONS AND PERSONS 1 4 3
( 1 9 84); see also THOMAS NAGEL, THE V IEW FROM N O W H ERE 1 5 2-53 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ; Fi nkelstein,
supra note 1 07, a t 94LJ..-4 5 .
1 1 4.
See supra note 1 ! 3 .
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generally, we demand that the act be done for the sake of the greater good.
This way of distinguishing excuse from j ustification, however, does have
a somewhat counterintuitive result. The case of the person threatened with
death unless he robs the bank must be grouped with the case of the person who
breaks into a cabin in the woods to keep himself from freezing to death, and
both are placed under the heading of "duress." But unless we can find a way of
j u stifying the apparently spurious distinction between manmade and natural
threats, there is no reason for treating these cases differently. The disinterested
bystander who sets fire to a field to prevent a forest fire from engulfing a town
acts for the sake of the greater good, rather than for interests of his own. It
does not seem unreasonable to hold the disinterested agent to a higher standard
of evaluation, since he does not require our understanding and sympathy.
I n l i ght o f the suggested basis for distinguishing excuse from
j ustification, certain general secondary characteristics of each become easier to
understand. If j ustifications are characterized by the fact that they rest on agent
neutral reasons for acting, it makes sense that thi rd parties can assist in the
performance of j ustified acts. 1 1 s Where the reason for exoneration is personal
to the actor, that is, where the reason for acting i s agent-relative, third parties
are appropriately barred from assisting, unless they share the excuse as well .
Excuse and j ustification are also sometimes distingui shed in terms o f
reliance. As Fletcher interestingly argues, o n e should not have a right t o rely
on the availability of an excuse ex a n te , but one should have the right to rely on
a j ustificatio n . t t 6 Distinguishing excuses from j ustifications in this way is
plausible i n most cases. A defendant who argues she was insane or mistaken as
to a factual matter at the time of the act could not also claim to have relied on
rules governing insanity or mistake, on pain of contradiction. Justifications, by
contrast, set out rules of conduct that individuals can use to guide their
behavior, since the availability of a j ustification does not generally turn on the
personal characteristics of the actor. 1 l7 Although the argument that excuses fail
to generate a right of reliance may appear to depend on a conception of excuses
as i nvolving involuntary conduct, c harac t er-bas ed excuses should resist reliance
as wel l . A character rationale for a certain act, such as loyalty , i mpl ies practical
deliberation that takes place largely outside the ambit of le g al incentive s . That
an agent rel i ed on the availabil ity of a d efe n s e seems more appropriate where
the act was u n dertaken for obj ective reasons. A c h a n g e in l a w could
dramatically affect the actor' s incentives i n the l atter sort o f ca s e but is
unlikely to do so in t h e former.
,

Against the background of an Aristotelian conception of responsibility ,
then , we c a n afford t o rej ect t h e bifurca tion of defe n s e s i n to lack o f
voluntariness, o n the one hand, and j ustification o n the other. Thi s i s bec ause an
agent can fai l to be mom. l ly responsible for a chosen act . All chosen acts are
voluntary, since, as Ari s totle says, the voluntary extends more w idely than the
chosen. To say that a n act i s chosen i s therefore to say nt 8. minimum that the
agent is responsible for it, in the non -rnoral sense, and that she can be called to
account. The j u dgment we rnake o f the agent i n l i ght of her :::.t c tion will then

17.

1 1 5.

George Fletcher, ..Rig h ts and Excuses,

1 1 6.

ld. a t ). 4 .
ld. at l 7 .
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depend on the substance o f the reason the agent offers in her explanation of
why she did it. When the action stems from a settled disposition , the reason the
agent gives for having pursued the course she did will reveal somethin g about
her character. If the reason for the action, for example, was l ove for a friend
o r a member of one ' s family, we will usually take a benevolent vie w of the
agent. We do not find the action blameworthy, then , because it is a product of
the very dispositions we would hope to i nculcate by administering p u nishment
or blame. The agent i s responsible for the action in virtue of the voluntariness
of the action, but she is not morally responsible, in the sense of culpable, since
the action is not a reflection of a vicious character.
One might suppose that the above discussion misses the point, since what
we want to know is whether our attitudes of symp athy and identification
towards victims of duress are justified. The welfarist, for examp l e , would
maintain that the fact that we tend to understand and accept action performed
for reasons of this sort does not do the normative work that must be done if we
are to provide a rationale for the defense. If it does not enhance soc i al welfare
to exonerate agents acting under duress, perhaps we cannot j ustify a rule
permitting the duress defense.
B ut the welfarist response demands too much of moral theory. The ever
so human dispositions tapped i nto by the coercer do not themselves s tand in
need of justification, at least not at the level of analysis at which the question of
exemption from punishment applies. Preferring our own preservati o n to that of
others, or wanting to save loved ones at the expense of strang e rs , are
dispositions which form background conditions for normative analysis. Legal
and moral rules are at least substantially reflective of the ethical fabric of our
actual mode of existence. Although they push and encourage ethical change at
the margins, they do not create that fabric for the most part, and one should not
expect to be able to justify them on the basis of first principles alone.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our jurisprudence i nherits from moral philosophy the mistaken view that
human beings are morally accountable for all the intended consequences of
their behavior. The claim of thi s Article has been that it is to this mistaken
conception that we owe the bifurcation of theories of duress into the welfarist
and voluntarist positions. But the conception itself only came to look sensible
once a certain philosophical transformation had taken place, namely the notion
of choice had replaced the Aristotelian focus on dispositions.
O n a certai n view, choice operates i n dependently each time it is
exercised. Its consequences, i ntentional actions, must therefore be assessed
individually. No previous exercise of choice is relevant for present o r future
choices. And this constitutes a rejecti on of the relevance of character to moral
j udgment, which l inks the choices and actions of a person over ti me. With the
move from character to choice, there was a co rrespon d i ng move from
d i sposition to act. The si ngle act became the centerpiece of modern ethics, and
moral j udgment became a way of evaluating individual acts, a turning away
from the notion of ethical evaluation of persons . Behavior i s taken p iecemeal on
the modem view: each act is assessed for the amount of good or bad it brings
i n to the world. Agents are thus morally accountable for a l l the acti ons they
perform i ntentionally, since each i ntentional action represents an i n d i vidual
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choice.
What i s missing from the modern view i s a principle of moral evaluation
of actors, and thi s absence in the background conception requ i res a
psychological theory o f exoneratio n l i ke excuse to turn i nstead to the
underlying voluntariness of the act. The natural focus on the actor i s thus either
eliminated, and excuses are transformed into justifications, or it is misconceived
in a way that turns the voluntary into the involuntary in order to undermine the
appli cabil i ty of ethical assessment. Fletcher is in a sense correct when he says
that Anglo-American jurisprudence resists the concept of excuse. I I S We resist it
as a grounds of moral judgment, even though we accept it as a grounds for
denying the applicability of moral judgment.
We have lost the ability to make sense of a defense l ike duress, then,
because we have lost the concept of character judgment, and we have put in its
place the less coherent notion of mora l evaluation of an action, stemming from
the idea that each action is the product of an independent exercise of choice.
The concept of an excuse, however, fits into the space between j udgment of
persons and judgment of actions. Since modern moral philosophy collapses this
space, the possible bases for exoneration that remain are either increase in
soci al welfare or bodily movement which is not i ntentional.
This Article has presented the two standard rationales for duress and has
attempted to show that neither rationale proves adequate to explain the defense
in its present form. What the Article presents is not a c omplete theory of
duress, but a way of conceptualizing the defense and a philosophical rationale
for a concept with its general characteristics. It argues that the two standard
theories emerge as the sole alternatives only against the background of the
modern conception of respon s i b i l i t y . On a d i fferent c o n c ep t i o n o f
responsibility, an older conception, a third possibil i ty emerges : a notion o f
excuse which is not based o n J o s s of control or impaired voluntari ness. Anglo
American j u risprudence h as been particularly resistant to the idea that excuse
can i tself function as a normati ve principle, and since the only normative
principle available seems to be justification, it resorts to the nonmoral principle
of defective action in order to exempt an actor from puni shment when
j ustification is unavailable. But the supposition that the only ethical principle we
have in our arsenal i s the principle of welfare-maximi zatio n is an overly
narrow one. It is a restriction one must accept only on a theory of moral
responsibility that l eaves di s p o si t i on s and character out of the picture.
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